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Barnett: Equity--Injunctions--Temporary Dissolved Where Answer Denied Subs

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ary of a state, where jurisdiction hinged upon such fact, was for
the determination of the jury.' However, the Louisiana court,
apparently standing alone on the proposition, has held that a
question of venue in a criminal case was one of fact which could
be determined by the judge on a special plea preceding the
trial.!
Whether the question of jurisdiction should be decided by
the jury or not seems to depend upon how the question is raised.
Logically the question is one of preliminary character and if so
presented there is no reason why it should not be determined by
the court. But if raised under the general issue we have a situation where the fact of jurisdiction is immediately relevant to
the question of guilt or innocence. In this state of the case the
jurisdictional fact would be made a material fact in the determination of the case on its merits. And thus the determination of this
fact would be for the jury just as would any other material question of fact under the general issue.

-LoY

C. HANs.

EQUITY - INJUNCTIONS - TEM.PORARY INJUNCTION DisSOLVED WHERE ANswER DENIED SUBSTANCE OF BILL. - In a chancery suit to establish title to standing timber P obtained a temporary injunction restraining D from cutting and removing the
timber. P claimed title through a sale October 29, 1929 by a
special commissioner upon a decree in a general creditors suit
against K Co. Since D, though not a party to the suit, proved a
claim P contended that D was bound by.the orders and decrees in
the said suit which P claimed adjudicated title to the timber in
controversy in K Co. D claimed title to the timber by virtue of
a deed from S after an alleged forfeiture of the timber rights
under an agreement with K Co. whereby the latter upon payment
of $1000.00 yearly in advance had the right for twelve years to
enter and cut the timber. The agreement contained the stipulation
that failure so to pay on the date named would forfeit the benefits
of the agreement. Upon default in payment S, relying on the
forfeiture, sold the timber to D on August 23, 1929, but it did
S. v. John Canoe, 66 U. S. 225 (1862).
' State v. Prudhomme, 171 La. 143, 129 So. 736 (1930).
See State v.
Moore, 140 La.*281, 72 So. 965 (1916). Although the question in what parish
the offense was. committed is a question of fact it does not pertain to the
guilt or innocence of the accused and may be decided by the judge.
7U.
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not appear that any notice was given to K Co. or to P. The court
held it to be error to refuse to dissolve the injunction upon motion
when the answer sworn to and supported by affidavits fully, fairly,
and positively denied the material allegations of the bill, especially
since the title and right of P to the timber were doubtful. Styber
v. Oaflisch&
Lumber Co.'
It will be noted that the case arises and is decided on the
pleadings. In such a situation the dissolution or continuance of
an injunction is largely a matter of judicial discretion and unless
it appears from the record of the proceedings that such discretion
has been abused the action of the court will be sustained? In the
exercise of such discretion in granting injunctions, court will
generally balance the hardships imposed on the parties, and if
the hardship resulting to D is greatly disproportionate to the benefit accruing to P, the injunction will be denied.
Viewing the position of the parties here it seems that D would
have been in a better position if the injunction were continued
than P was when it was dissolved. If the injunction were continued and D prevailed on the final hearing it does not appear that
he would be any worse off, but if P prevailed his legal remedy
would be inadequate since the amount and value of the timber was
uncertain. In some instances the injunction has been dissolved on
the execution of a bond by D,8 but the result is questionable for to
dissolve the injunction is to say that P has no case fit to be heard
since the very act itself will be done and the very relief P seeks
is denied.' That the act against which protection is sought might
be completed before final hearing affords strong ground for continuing the injunction.'
The rule relied on is well settled law in this state,' but is this
a proper situation to apply it more or less mechanically? If there
is a possibility that P might recover the injunction should not'be
dissolved." The interest of P in this case is to all intents that of a
1158 S. E. 669 (1931).
2
Rogers v. Tennant, 45 Cal. 184 (1872).

6
City of Fort Dodge v. Fort Dodge Telephone Co., 172 Iowa 638, 154 N. W.
914 (1915).
'Purnell v. Daniel, 43 N. C. 9 (1851); Shonk v. Knight, 12 W. Va. 667,

683 (1878).

Cronin v. Bloemeeke, 58 N. J. Eq. 313, 43 Atl. 605 (1899).
Hayzlett v. MeMillan, 11 W. Va. 464 (1877); Mason City S. & M. Co.
v. Town of Mason, 23 W. Va. 211 (1883); Schoonover v. Bright, 24 W. Va.
698 (1884); Marcum v. Marcum, 57 W. Va. 285, 50 S. E. 246 (1905); Lewis
v. Hall, 64 W. Va. 147, 61 S. E. 317 (1908).
7"The answers fully, fairly, plainly, distinctly and positively deny the
allegation and therefore according to the general rule laid down by this
court in Hayzlett v. MoMillan, 11 W. Va. 464, the court on the coming in of
0
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lessee. The stipulation as to forfeiture in the agreement was for
the purpose of securing to S the payment of the rental during the
years the lease was to continue. If P could have the forfeiture set
aside he would have a fair chance to establish his claim on the final
hearing. As a general rule equity will set aside a forfeiture for
the non-payment of rent where compensation can be made.' In
West Virginia specific provision is made for relief from a forf6iture for non-payment of rent,' and in a recent case relief from
such forfeiture was granted in which the court relied definitely
on this statutory provision.0 Thus it appears that P might secure
relief from the forfeiture and in order to secure his interests it
would seem that the injunction should not have been dissolved.
c H. BARNETT.
-FRmE

Res Gestae - SUicmDE NoTEs. - In a suit on a
war risk insurance policy, the beneficiaries contended that C, the
veteran insured therein, disappeared from his Norfolk home on
January 8, 1921, and died before the lapse of the policy on March
1, 1921. C left his employer's office on the morning of January
8 with a man who had just shown him a paper and had given him
a short time on the same day within which to make good some
obligation. In the afternoon mail, C's wife received a suicide note
dated that morning.' Later a man was seen by a boy to leave his
coat on a bridge platform twenty miles from Norfolk and to walk
away. The boy took the coat home and in its pocket found a second
note which was forwarded to the wife within the week and which
EVIDENCE -

such answers, ought to have dissolved the injunction if, as was the case, the
allegations of the bill were unsupported by proof. It is true there are
various exceptions to this general rule as where the plaintiff would lose all
the benefit which would otherwise accrue to him should he finally succeed in
the cause, or where the facts disclosed by the bill and answer afford strong
presumption that the plaintiff will establish his claim for relief on the
parol hearing, and it appears that he will suffer great and immediate injury by a dissolution of the injunction, or when a dissolution of the injunction would in effect amount to a complete denial of the relief sought."
v. Knight, 12 W. Va. 667, 683 (1878).
Shonk
8
Wheeling & E. G. Ry. Co. v. Triadelphia, 58 W. Va. 487, 516, 52 S. E.
499, 511 (1905); Spies v. Ry. Co., 60 W. Va. 389, 55 S. E. 464 (1906);
Pheasant v. Hanna, 63 W. Va. 613, 60 S. E. 618 (1908); South Penn Oil Co.
v. Edgell, 48 W. Va. 348, 37 S. E. 596, 86 Am. St. Rep. 43 (1900); Lynch v.
Versailles Fuel Gas Co., 165 Pa. St. 518, 30 Atl. 984 (1895).
9 W. VA. RLv. CoDn (1931) c. 37, art. 20, § 6.
'" Beech Fork Coal Co. v. Pocahontas Corporation, 109 W. Va. 39, 152 S.

E.785 (1930).

' This note, signed "Billie", simply told of intended suicide.
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